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Introduction
Modern medical technology seems to confront us with many questions not
faced even a decade ago. Corresponding changes in medical practice have
benefited many, but have also prompted fears by some that they will be
aggressively treated against their will or denied the kind of care that is their due as
human persons with inherent dignity. Current debates about life-sustaining
treatment suggest that our society'Smoral reflection is having difficulty keeping
pace with its technological progress.
A religious view oflife has an important contribution to make to these modern
debates. Our Catholic tradition has developed a rich body of thought on these
questions, which affirms a duty to preserve human life but recognizes limits to
that duty.
Our first goal in making this statement is to reaffirm some basic principles of
our moral tradition, to assist Catholics and others in making treatment decisions
in accord with respect for God's gift of life.
These principles do not provide clear and final answers to all moral questions
that arise as individuals make difficult decisions. Catholic theologians may differ
on how best to apply moral principles to some questions not explicitly resolved
by the Church's teaching authority. Likewise, we understand that those who
must make serious health care decisions for themselves or for others face a
complexity of issues, circumstances, thoughts and emotions in each unique case.
This is the case with some questions involving the medically assisted provision
of nutrition and hydration to helpless patients - those who are seriously ill,
disabled or persistently unconscious. These questions have been made more
urgent by widely publicized court cases and the public debate to which they have
given rise.
Our second purpose in issuing this statement, then, is to provide some
clarification of the moral issues involved in decisions about medically assisted
nutrition and hydration. We are fully aware that such guidance is not necessarily
final, because there are many unresolved medical and ethical questions related to
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these issues and the contmwng development of medical technology will
necessitate ongoing reflection. But these decisions already confront patients,
families and health care personnel every day. They arise whenever competent
patients make decisions about medically assisted nutrition and hydration for their
own present situation, when they consider signing an advance directive such as a
"living will" or health care proxy document, and when families or other proxy
decisionmakers make decisions about those entrusted to their care. We offer
guidance to those who, facing these issues, might be confused by opinions that at
times threaten to deny the inherent dignity of human life. We therefore address
our reflections first to those who share our Judeo-Christian traditions, and
secondly to others concerned about the dignity and value of human life who seek
guidance in making their own moral decisions.
Moral Principles
The Judeo-Christian moral tradition celebrates life as the gift of a loving God,
and respects the life of each human being because each is made in the image and
likeness of God. As Christians we also believe we are redeemed by Christ and
called to share eternal life with Him. From these roots the Catholic tradition has
developed a distinctive approach to fostering and sustaining human life. Our
Church views life as a sacred trust, a gift over which we are given stewardship and
not absolute dominion. The Church thus opposes all direct attacks on innocent
life. As conscientious stewards we have a duty to preserve life, while recognizing
certain limits to that duty:
(1) Because human life is the foundation for all other human goods, it has a
special value and significance. Life is "the first right of the human person" and
"the condition of all the others."1
(2) All crimes against life, including "euthanasia or willful suicide," must be
opposed. 2 Euthanasia is "an action or an omission which of itself or by intention
causes death, in order that all suffering may in this way be eliminated." Its terms
of reference are to be found "in the intention of the will and in the methods
used."3 Thus defined, euthanasia is an attack on life which no one has a right to
make or request, and which no government or other human authority can
legitimately recommend or permit. Although individual guilt may be reduced or
absent because of suffering or emotional factors that cloud the conscience, this
does not change the objective wrongfulness of the act. It should also be
recognized that an apparent plea for death may really be a plea for help and love.
(3) Suffering is a fact of human life, and has special significance for the
Christian as an opportunity to share in Christ's redemptive suffering.
Nevertheless there is nothing wrong in trying to relieve someone's suffering; in
fact it is a positive good to do so, as long as one does not intentionally cause death
or interfere with other moral and religious duties. 4
(4) Everyone has the duty to care for his or her own life and health and to seek
necessary medical care from others, but this does not mean that all possible
remedies must be used in all circumstances. One is not obliged to use either
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"extraordinary" means or "disproportionate" means of preserving life - that is,
means which are understood as offering no reasonable hope of benefit or as
involving excessive burdens. Decisions regarding such means are complex, and
should ordinarily be made by the patient in consultation with his or her family,
chaplain or pastor, and physician when that is possible. s
(5) In the final stage of dying one is not obliged to prolong the life of the
patient by every possible means: "When inevitable death is imminent in spite of
the means used, it is permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse forms of
treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of
life, so long as the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases is not
interrupted. "6
(6) While affirming life as a gift of God, the Church recognizes that death is
unavoidable and that it can open the door to etemallife. Thus, "without in any
way hastening the hour of death," the dying person should accept its reality and
prepare for it emotionally and spiritually.?
(7) Decisions regarding human life must respect the demands of justice,
viewing each human being as our neighbor and avoiding all discrimination based
on age or dependency.8 A human being has "a unique dignity and an independent
value, from the moment of conception and in every stage of development,
whatever his or her physical condition." In particular, "the disabled person
(whether the disability be the result of a congenital handicap, chronic illness or
accident, or from mental or physical deficiency, and whatever the severity ofthe
disability) is a fully human subject, with the corresponding innate, sacred and
inviolable rights." First among these is "the fundamental and inalienable right to
life."9
(8) The dignity and value ofthe human person, which lie at the foundation of
the Church's teaching on the right to life, also provide a basis for any just social
order. Not only to become more Christian, but to become more truly human,
society should protect the right to life through its laws and other policies. lO
While these principles grow out of a specific religious tradition, they appeal to
a common respect for the dignity of the human person. We commend them to all
people of good will.
Questions About Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration

In what follows we apply these well-established moral principles to the
difficult issue of providing medically assisted nutrition and hydration to persons
who are seriously ill, disabled or persistently unconscious. We recognize the
complexity involved in applying these principles to individual cases and
acknowledge that, at this time and on this particular issue, our applications do not
have the same authority as the principles themselves.
1. Is the withholding or withdrawing of medically assisted nutrition and
hydration always a direct killing?

In answering this question one should avoid two extremes.
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First, it is wrong to say that this could not be a matter of killing simply because
it involves an omission rather than a positive action. In fact a deliberate omission
may be an effective and certain way to kill, especially to kill someone weakened
by illness. Catholic teaching condemns as euthanasia "an action or an omission
which of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in this
way be elminiated." Thus "euthanasia includes not only active mercy killing but
also the omission of treatment when the purpose of the omission is to kill the
patient." 11
Second, we should not assume that all or most decisions to withhold or
withdraw medically assisted nutrition and hydration are attempts to cause death.
To be sure, any patient will die if all nutrition and hydration are withheld. 12 But
sometimes other causes are at work - for example, the patient may be
imminently dying, whether feeding takes place or not, from an already existing
terminal condition. At other times, although the shortening of the patient's life is
one foreseeable result of an omission, the real purpose of the omission was to
relieve the patient of a particular procedure that was of limited usefulness to the
patient or unreasonably burdensome for the patient and the patient's family or
caregivers. This kind of decision should not be equated with a decision to kill or
with suicide.
The harsh reality is that some who propose withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration from certain patients do directly intend to bring about a patient's death,
and would even prefer a change in the law to allow for what they see as more
"quick and painless" means to cause death.13 In other words, nutrition and
hydration (whether orally administered or medically assisted) are sometimes
withdrawn not because a patient is dying, but precisely because a patient is not
dying (or not dying quickly) and someone believes it would be better ifhe or she
did, generally because the patient is perceived as having an unacceptably low
"quality of life" or as imposing burdens on others. 14
When deciding whether to withhold or withdraw medically assisted nutrition
and hydration, or other forms oflife support, we are called by our moral tradition
to ask ourselves: What will my decision do for this patient? And what am I trying
to achieve by doing it? We must be sure that it is not our intent to cause the
patient's death - either for its own sake or as a means to achieving some other
goal such as the relief of suffering.
2. Is medically assisted nutrition and hydration a form of "treatment" or
"care"?
Catholic teaching provides that a person in the final stages of dying need not
accept "forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome
prolongation of life," but should still receive "the normal care due to the sick
person in similar cases."lS All patients deserve to receive normal care out of
respect for their inherent dignity as persons. As Pope John Paul II has said, a
decision to forgo "purely experimental or ineffective interventions" does not
"dispense from the valid therapeutic task of sustaining life or from assistance with
the normal means of sustaining life. Science, even when it is unable to heal, can
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and should care for and assist the sick."16 But the teaching of the Church has not
resolved the question whether medically assisted nutrition and hydration should
always be seen as a form of normal careY
Almost everyone agrees that oral feeding, when it can be accepted and
assimilated by a patient, is a form of care owed to all helpless people. Christians
should be especially sensitive to this obligation, because giving food and drink to
those in need is an important expression of Christian love and concern (Mt. 10:42
and 25:35; Mk. 9:41). But our obligations become less clear when adequate
nutrition and hydration require the skills of trained medical personnel and the use
of technologies that maybe perceived as very burdensome - that is, as intrusive,
painful or repugnant. Such factors vary from one type of feeding procedure to
another, and from one patient to another, making it difficult to classify all feeding
procedures as either "care" or "treatment."
Perhaps this dilemma should be viewed in a broader context. Even medical
"treatments" are morally obligatory when they are "ordinary" means - that is, if
they provide a reasonable hope of benefit and do not involve excessive burdens.
Therefore we believe people should make decisions in light of a simple and
fundamental insight: Out of respect for the dignity of the human person, we are
obliged to preserve our own lives, and help others preserve theirs, by the use of
means that have a reasonable hope of sustaining life without imposing
unreasonable burdens on those we seek to help, that is, on the patient and his or
her family and community.
We must therefore address the question of benefits and burdens next,
recognizing that a full moral analysis is only possible when one knows the effects
of a given procedure on a particular patient.
3. What are the benefits of medically assisted nutrition and hydration?

According to international codes of medical ethics, a physician will see a
medical procedure as appropriate "if in his or her judgment it offers hope of
saving life, reestablishing health or alleviating suffering."18
Nutrition and hydration, whether provided in the usual way or with medical
assistance, do not by themselves remedy pathological conditions, except those
caused by dietary deficiencies. But patients benefit from them in several ways.
First, for all patients who can assimilate them, suitable food and fluids sustain life,
and providing them normally expresses loving concern and solidarity with the
helpless. Second, for patients being treated with the hope of a cure, appropriate
food and fluids are an important element of sound health care. Third, even for
patients who are imminently dying and incurable, food and fluids can prevent the
suffering that may arise from dehydration, hunger and thirst.
The benefit of sustaining and fostering life is fundamental, because life is our
first gift from a loving God and the condition for receiving His other gifts. But
sometimes even food and fluids are no longer effective in providing this benefit,
because a patient has entered the final stage of a terminal condition. At such times
we should make the dying person as comfortable as possible and provide nursing
care and proper hygiene as well as companionship and appropriate
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spiritual aid. Such a person may lose all desire for food and drink and even be
unable to ingest them. Initiating medically assisted feeding or intravenous fluids
in this case may increase the patient's discomfort while providing no real benefit;
ice chips or sips of water may instead be appropriate to provide comfort and
counteract the adverse effects of dehydration. 19 Even in the case of the
imminently dying patient, of course, any action or omission that of itself or by
intention causes death is to be absolutely rejected.
As Christians who trust in the promise of etemallife, we recognize that death
does not have the final word. Accordingly we need not always prevent death
until the last possible moment; but we should never intentionally cause death or
abandon the dying person as though he or she were unworthy of care and respect.
4. What are the burdens of medically assisted nutrition and hydration?

Our tradition does not demand heroic measures in fulfilling the obligation to
sustain life. A person may legitimately refuse even procedures that effectively
prolong life, ifhe or she believes they would impose excessively grave burdens on
himself or herself, or on his or her family and community. Catholic theologians
have traditionally viewed medical treatment as excessively burdensome if it is
"too painful, too damaging to the patient's bodily self and functioning, too
psychologically repugnant to the patient, too restrictive of the patient's liberty
and preferred activities, too suppressive of the patient's mental life, or too
expensive."20
Because assessment of these burdens necessarily involves some sUbjective
judgments, a conscious and competent patient is generally the best judge of
whether a particular burden or risk is too grave to be tolerated in his or her own
case. But because of the serious consequences of withdrawing all nutrition and
hydration, patients and those helping them make decisions should assess such
burdens or risks with special care.
Here we offer some brief reflections and cautions regarding the kinds of
burdens sometimes associated with medically assisted nutrition and hydration.

• Physical risks and burdens
The risks and objective complications of medically assisted nutrition and
hydration will depend on the procedure used and the condition of the patient. In a
given case a feeding procedure may become harmful or even life-threatening.
(These medical data are discussed at length in an Appendix to this paper.)
If the risks and burdens of a particular feeding procedure are deemed serious
enough to warrant withdrawing it, we should not automatically deprive the
patient of all nutrition and hydration but should ask whether another procedure
is feasible that would be less burdensome. We say this because some helpless
patients, including some in a "persistent vegetative state," receive tube feedings
not because they cannot swallow food at all but because tube feeding is less costly
and difficult for health care personnel,21
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Moreover, because burdens are assessed in relation to benefits, we should ask
whether the risks and discomfort of a feeding procedure are really excessive as
compared with the adverse effects of dehydration or malnutrition.

• Psychological burdens on the patient
Many people see feeding tubes as frightening or even as bodily violations.
Assessments of such burdens are necessarily subjective; they should not be
dismissed on that account, but we offer some practical cautions to help prevent
abuse.
First, in keeping with our moral teaching against the intentional causing of
death by omission, one should distinguish between repugnance to a particular
procedure and repugnance to life itself. The latter may occur when a patient
views a life of helplessness and dependency on others as itself a heavy burden,
leading him or her to wish or even to pray for death. Especially in our
achievement-oriented society, the burden ofliving in such a condition may seem
to outweigh any possible benefit of medical treatment and even lead a person to
despair. But we should not assume that the burdens in such a case always
outweigh the benefits; for the sufferer, given good counseling and spiritual
support, may be brought again to appreciate the precious gift of life.
Second, our tradition recognizes that when treatment decisions are made,
"account will have to be taken of the reasonable wishes of the patient and the
patient's family, as also of the advice of the doctors who are specially competent
in the matter."22 The word "reasonable" is important here. Good health care
providers will try to help patients assess psychological burdens with full
information and without undue fear of unfamiliar procedures. 23 A well-trained
and compassionate hospital chaplain can provide valuable personal and spiritual
support to patients and families facing these difficult situations.
Third, we should not assume that a feeding procedure is inherently repugnant
to all patients without specific evidence. In contrast to Americans' general
distaste for the idea of being supported by "tubes and machines," some studies
indicate surprisingly favorable views of medically assisted nutrition and
hydration among patients and families with actual experience of such
procedures.24

• Economic and other burdens on caregivers
While some balk at the idea, in principle cost can be a valid factor in decisions
about life support. For example, money spent on expensive treatment for one
family member may be money otherwise needed for food, housing and other
necessities for the rest of the family. Here, also, we offer some cautions.
First, particularly when a form of treatment "carries a risk or is burdensome"
on other grounds, a critically ill person may have a legitimate and altruistic desire
"not to impose excessive expense on the family or the community."25 Even for
altruistic reasons a patient should not directly intend his or her own death by
malnutrition or dehydration, but may accept an earlier death as a consequence of
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his or her refusal of an unreasonably expensive treatment. Decisions by others to
deny an incompetent patient medically assisted nutrition and hydration for
reasons of cost raise additional concerns about justice to the individual patient,
who could wrongly be deprived oflife itself to serve the less fundamental needs of
others.
Second, we do not think individual decisions about medically assisted
nutrition and hydration should be determined by macro-economic concerns such
as national budget priorities and the high cost of health care. These social
problems are serious, but it is by no means established that they require depriving
chronically ill and helpless patients of effective and easily tolerated measures that
they need to survive.26
Third, tube feeding alone is generally not very expensive and may cost no more
than oral feeding.27 What is seen by many as a grave financial and emotional
burden on caregivers is the total long-term care of severely debilitated patients,
who may survive for many years with no life support except medically assisted
nutrition and hydration and nursing care.
The difficulties families may face in this regard, and their need for improved
financial and other assistance from the rest of society, should not be
underestimated. While caring for a helpless loved one can provide many
intangible benefits to family members and bring them closer together, the
responsibilities of care can also strain even close and loving family relationships;
complex medical decisions must be made under emotionally difficult
circumstances not easily appreciated by those who have never faced such
situations.
Even here, however, we must try to think through carefully what we intend by
withdrawing medically assisted nutrition and hydration. Are we deliberately
trying to make sure that the patient dies, in order to relieve caregivers of the
financial and emotional burdens that will fall upon them if the patient survives?
Are we really implementing a decision to withdraw all other forms of care,
precisely because the patient offers so little response to the efforts of caregivers?
Decisions like these seem to reach beyond the weighing of burdens and benefits
of medically assisted nutrition and hydration as such.
In the context of official Church teaching, it is not yet clear to what extent we
may assess the burden of a patient's total care rather than the burden of a
particular treatment when we seek to refuse "burdensome" life support. On a
practical level, those seeking to make good decisions might assure themselves of
their own intentions by asking: Does my decision aim at relieving the patient of a
particularly grave burden imposed by medically assisted nutrition and hydration?
Or does it aim to avoid the total burden of caring for the patient? If so, does it
achieve this aim by deliberately bringing about his or her death?
Rather than leaving families to confront such dilemmas alone, society and
government should improve their assistance to families whose financial and
emotional resources are strained by long-term care of loved ones. 28
5. What role should "quality of life" play in our decisions?

Financial and emotional burdens are willingly endured by most families to
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raise their children or to care for mentally aware but weak and elderly family
members. It is sometimes argued that we need not endure comparable burdens to
feed and care for persons with severe mental and physical disabilities, because
their low "quality of life" makes it unnecessary or pointless to preserve their
lives. 29
But this argument - even when it seems motivated by a humanitarian
concern to reduce suffering and hardship - ignores the equal dignity and
sanctity of all human life. Its key assumption - that people with disabilities
necessarily enjoy life less than others or lack the potential to lead meaningful lives
- is also mistaken. 30 Where suffering does exist, society's response should not be
to neglect or eliminate the lives of people with disabilities, but to help correct their
inadequate living conditions. 3l Very often the worst threat to a good "quality of
life" for these people is not the disability itself, but the prejudicial attitudes of
others - attitudes based on the idea that a life with serious disabilities is not
worth living.32
This being said, our moral tradition allows for three ways in which the "quality
of life" of a seriously ill patient is relevant to treatment decisions:
(l) Consistent with respect for the inherent sanctity oflife, we should relieve
needless suffering and support morally acceptable ways of improving each
patient's quality of life. 33
(2) One may legitimately refuse a treatment because it would itself create an
impairment imposing new serious burdens or risks on the patient. This decision to
avoid the new burdens or risks created by a treatment is not the same as directly
intending to end life in order to avoid the burden ofliving in a disabled state. 34
(3) Sometimes a disabling condition may directly influence the benefits and
burdens of a specific treatment for a particular patient. For example, a confused
or demented patient may find medically assisted nutrition and hydration more
frightening and burdensome than other patients do because he or she cannot
understand what it is. The patient may even repeatedly pull out feeding tubes,
requiring burdensome physical restraints if this form of feeding is to be continued.
In such cases, ways of alleviating such special burdens should be explored before
concluding that they justify withholding all food and fluids needed to sustain life.
These humane considerations are quite different from a "quality of life" ethic
that would judge individuals with disabilities or limited potential as not worthy of
care or respect. It is one thing to withhold a procedure because it would impose
new disabilities on a patient, and quite another thing to say that patients who
already have such disabilities should not have their lives preserved. A means
considered ordinary or proportionate for other patients should not be considered
extraordinary or disproportionate for severely impaired patients solely because of
a judgment that their lives are not worth living.
In short, while considerations regarding a person's quality of life have some
validity in weighing the burdens and benefits of medical treatment, at the present
time in our society judgments about the quality of life are sometimes used to
promote euthanasia. The Church must emphasize the sanctity of life of each
person as a fundamental principle in all moral decisionmaking.
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6. Do persistendy unconscious patients represent a special case?

Even Catholics who accept the same basic moral principles may strongly
disagree on how to apply them to patients who appear to be persistently
unconscious - that is, those who are in a permanent coma or a "persistent
vegetative state" (PVS).3S Some moral questions in this area have not been
explicitly resolved by the Church's teaching authority.
On some points there is wide agreement among Catholic theologians:
(1) An unconscious patient must be treated as a living human person with
inherent dignity and value. Direct killing of such a patient is as morally
reprehensible as the direct killing of anyone else. Even the medical terminology
used to describe these patients as "vegetative" unfortunately tends to obscure this
vitally important point, inviting speculation that a patient in this state is a
"vegetable" or a subhuman animal. 36
(2) The area of legitimate controversy does not concern patients with
conditions like mental retardation, senility, dementia or even temporary
unconsciousness. Where serious disagreement begins is with the patient who has
been diagnosed as completely and permanently unconscious after careful testing
over a period of weeks or months.
Some moral theologians argue that a particular form of care or treatment is
morally obligatory only when its benefits outweigh its burdens to a patient or the
care providers. In weighing burdens, they say, the total burden of a procedure and
the consequent requirements of care must be taken into account. If no benefit can
be demonstrated, the procedure, whatever its burdens, cannot be obligatory.
These moralists also hold that the chief criterion to determine the benefit of a
procedure cannot be merely that it prolongs physical life, since physical life is not
an absolute good but is relative to the spiritual good of the person. They assert
that the spiritual good of the person is union with God, which can be advanced
only by human acts, i.e., conscious, free acts. Since the best current medical
opinion holds that persons in the persistent vegetative state (PVS) are incapable
now or in the future of conscious, free human acts, these moralists conclude that,
when careful diagnosis verifies this condition, it is not obligatory to prolong life
by such interventions as a respirator, antibiotics, or medically assisted hydration
and nutrition. To decide to omit non-obligatory care, therefore, is not to intend
the patient's death, but only to avoid the burden of the procedure. Hence, though
foreseen, the patient's death is to be attributed to the patient's pathological
condition and not to the omission of care. Therefore, these theologians conclude,
while it is always wrong directly to intend or cause the death of such patients, the
natural dying process which would have occurred without these interventions
may be permitted to proceed.
While this rationale is convincing to some, it is not theologically conclusive
and we are not persuaded by it. In fact, other theologians argue cogently that
theological inquiry could lead one to a more carefully limited conclusion.
These moral theologians argue that while particular treatments can be judged
useless or burdensome, it is morally questionable and would create a dangerous
precedent to imply that any human life is not a positive good or "benefit." They
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emphasize that while life is not the highest good, it is always and everywhere a
basic good of the human person and not merely a means to other goods. They
further assert that if the "burden" one is trying to relieve by discontinuing
medically assisted nutrition and hydration is the burden of remaining alive in the
allegedly undignified condition of PVS, such a decision is unacceptable, because
one's intent is only achieved by deliberately ensuring the patient's death from
malnutrition or dehydration. Finally, these moralists suggest that PVS is best seen
as an extreme form of mental and physical disability - one whose causes, nature
and prognosis are as yet imperfectly understood - and not as a terminal illness or
fatal pathology from which patients should generally be allowed to die. Because
the patient's life can often be sustained indefinitely by medically assisted nutrition
and hydration that is not unreasonably risky or burdensome for that patient, they
say, we are not dealing here with a case where "inevitable death is imminent in
spite of the means used."3? Rather, because the patient will die in a few days if
medically assisted nutrition and hydration are discontinued,38 but can often live a
long time if they are provided, the inherent dignity and worth of the human
person obligates us to provide this patient with care and support.
Further complicating this debate is a disagreement over what responsible
Catholics should do in the absence of a final resolution of this question. Some
point to our moral tradition of probabilism, which would allow individuals to
follow the appropriate moral analysis that they find persuasive. Others point to
the principle that in cases where one might risk unjustly depriving someone of
life, we should take the safer course.
In the face of the uncertainties and unresolved medical and theological issues,
it is important to defend and preserve important values. On the one hand, there is
a concern that patients and families should not be subjected to unnecessary
burdens, ineffective treatments and indignities when death is approaching. On
the other hand, it is important to ensure that the inherent dignity of human
persons, even those who are persistently unconscious, is respected, and that no
one is deprived of nutrition and hydration with the intent of bringing on his or her
death.
It is not easy to arrive at a single answer to some of the real and personal
dilemmas involved in this issue. In study, prayer and compassion we continue to
reflect on this issue and hope to discover additional information that will lead to
its ultimate resolution.
In the meantime, at a practical level, we are concerned that withdrawal of all
life suppport, inc1uding.nutritionand hydration, not.oo viewed as appropriate or
automatically indicated for the entire class of PVS patients simply because of a
judgment that they are beyond the reach of medical treatment that would restore
consciousness. We note the current absence of conclusive scientific data on the
causes and implications of different degrees of brain damage, on the PVS patient's
ability to experience pain, and on the reliability of prognoses for many such
patients. 39 We do know that many of these patients have a good prognosis for
long-term survival when given medically assisted nutrition and hydration, and a
certain prognosis for death otherwise - and we know that many in our society
view such an early death as a positive good for a patient in this condition.
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Therefore we are gravely concerned about current attitudes and policy trends in
our society that would too easily dismiss patients without apparent mental
faculties as non-persons or as undeserving of human care and concern. In this
climate, even legitimate moral arguments intended to have careful and limited
application can easily be misinterpreted, broadened and abused by others to
erode respect for the lives of some of our society's most helpless members.
In light of these concerns, it is our considered judgment that while legitimate
Catholic moral debate continues, decisions about these patients should be guided
by a presumption in favor of medically assisted nutrition and hydration. A
decision to discontinue such measures should be made in light of a careful
assessment of the burdens and benefits of nutrition and hydration for the
individual patient and his or her family and community. Such measures must not
be withdrawn in order to cause death, but they may be withdrawn if they offer no
reasonable hope of sustaining life or pose excessive risks or burdens. We also
believe that social and health care policies should be carefully framed so that
these patients are not routinely classified as "terminal" or as prime candidates for
the discontinuance of even minimal means of life support.
7. Who should make decisions about medically assisted nutrition and
hydration?

"Who decides?" In our society many believe this is the most important or even
the only important question regarding this issue; and many understand it in terms
of who has legal status to decide. Our Catholic tradition is more concerned with
the principles for good moral decisionmaking, which apply to everyone involved
in a decision. Some general observations are appropriate here.
A competent patient is the primary decisionmaker about his or her own health
care, and is in the best situation to judge how the benefits and burdens of a
particular procedure will be experienced. Ideally the patient will act with the
advice of loved ones, of health care personnel who have expert knowledge of
medical aspects of the case, and of pastoral counselors who can help explore the
moral issues and spiritual values involved. A patient may wish to make known
his or her general wishes about life support in advance; such expressions cannot
have the weight of a fully informed decision made in the actual circumstances of
an illness, but can help guide others in the event of a later state of incompetency.40
Morally even the patient making decisions for himself or herself is bound by
norms that prohibit the directly intended causing of death through action or
omission, and by the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means.
When a patient is not competent to make his or her own decisions, a proxy
decisionmaker who shares the patient's moral convictions, such as a family
member or guardian, may be designated to represent the patient's interests and
interpret his or her wishes. Here, too, moral limits remain relevant - that is,
morally the proxy may not deliberately cause a patient's death or refuse what is
clearly ordinary means, even if he or she believes the patient would have made
such a decision.
Health care personnel should generally follow the reasonable wishes of
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patient or family, but must also consult their own consciences when participating
in these decisions. A physician or nurse told to participate in a course of action
that he or she views as clearly immoral has a right and responsibility either to
refuse to participate in this course of action or to withdraw from the case, and he
or she should be given the opportunity to express the reasons for such refusal in
the appropriate forum. Social and legal policies must protect such rights of
conscience.
Finally, because these are matters oflife and death for human persons, society
as a whole has a legitimate interest in responsible decisionmaking.41

Conclusion
In this document we reaffirm moral principles that provide a basis for
responsible discussion of the morality of life support. We also offer tentative
guidance on how to apply these principles to the difficult issue of medically
assisted nutrition and hydration.
We reject any omission of nutrition and hydration intended to cause a patient's
death. We hold for a presumption in favor of providing medically assisted
nutrition and hydration to patients who need it, which presumption would yield
in cases where such procedures have no medically reasonable hope of sustaining
life or pose excessive risks or burdens. Recognizing that judgments about the
benefits and burdens of medically assisted nutrition and hydration in individual
cases have a subjective element and are generally best made by the patient
directly involved, we also affirm a legitimate role for families' love and guidance,
health care professionals' ethical concerns, and society's interest in preserving life
and protecting the helpless. In rejecting broadly permissive policies on
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from vulnerable patients, we must also
help ensure that the burdens of caring for the helpless are more equitably shared
throughout our society.
We recognize that this document is our first word, not our last word, on some
of the complex questions involved in this subject. We urge Catholics and others
concerned about the dignity of the human person to study these reflections and
participate in the continuing public discussion of how best to address the needs of
the helpless in our society.

Appendix

Technical Aspects of Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration
Procedures for providing nourishment and fluids to patients who cannot
swallow food orally are either "parenteral" (bypassing the digestive tract) or
"enteral" (using the digestive tract).
Parenteral or intravenous feeding is generally considered "more hazardous
and more expensive" than enteral feeding.42 It can be subdivided into peripheral
intravenous feeding (using a needle inserted into a peripheral vein) and central
intravenous feeding, also known as total parenteral feeding or hyperalimentation
(using a larger needle inserted into a central vein near the heart). Peripheral
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intravenous lines can provide fluids and electrolytes as well as some nutrients;
they can maintain fluid balance and prevent dehydration; but cannot provide
adequate nutrition in the long term.43 Total parenteral feeding can provide a
more adequate nutritional balance, but poses significant risks to the patient and
may involve costs on an order of magnitude higher than other methods oftube
feeding. It is no longer considered experimental, and has become "a mainstay for
helping critically ill patients to survive acute illnesses where the prognosis had
previously been nearly hopeless," but its feasibility for life-long maintenance of
patients without a functioning gastrointestinal tract has been questioned. 44
Because of the limited usefulness of peripheral intravenous feeding and the
special burdens of total parenteral feeding - and because few patients so
completely lack a digestive system that they must depend on these measures for
their sole source of nutrition - enteral tube feeding is the focus of the current
debate over medically assisted nutrition and hydration. Such methods are used
when a patient has a functioning digestive system but is unable or unwilling to
ingest food orally and/or to swallow. The most common routes for enteral tube
feeding are nasogastric (introducing a thin plastic tube through the nasal cavity to
reach into the stomach), gastrostomy (surgical insertion of a tube through the
abdominal wall into the stomach), and jejunostomy (surgical insertion of a tube
through the abdominal wall into the small intestine).45 These methods are the
primary focus of this document.
Each method of enteral tube feeding has potential side-effects. For example,
nasogastric tubes must be inserted and monitored carefully so they will not
introduce food or fluids into the lungs. They may also irritate sensitive tissues and
create discomfort; confused or angry patients may sometimes try to remove them,
and efforts to restrain a patient to prevent this can impose additional discomfort
and other burdens. On the positive side, insertion of these tubes requires no
surgery and only a modicum of training. 46
Gastrostomy and jejunostomy tubes are better tolerated by many patients in
need oflong-term feeding. Their most serious physical burdens arise from the fact
that their insertion requires surgery using local or general anesthesia, which
involves some risk of infection and other complications. Once the surgical
procedure is completed, these tubes can often be maintained without serious pain
or medical complications, and confused patients do not often attempt to remove
them. 47
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